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-ABSTRACT- 
 
When Kazakhstan was trying to go out from economic, social and political 
transition, suddenly faced well-known problems of the oil-rich countries. It is 
absolutely vital that Kazakhstan evaluate its oil-income for going out from 
transition and developing itself in accordance with the conditions of market 
economy. After the suggestion of the IMF, Kazakh Government constituted 
an oil fund in order to prevent its economy from volatility of oil-revenue and 
price-chocks in the oil market.  
 
This paper aims to reveal the impacts of the Kazakh Oil Fund on monetary 
budgetary and macroeconomic stabilities of the country through time-series 
regression analysis. In doing so, I test also to what extent an oil fund works 
in a transition country. 
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A. Introduction  
 
There is a large set of economic problem that resource-abundant countries 
confront. However one can determine two main factors which activate the 
other ones: Price chocks in the world market and “Dutch disease”.   
 
Because of resource dependence resource-rich countries, notably oil-
abundant ones are often sensible to price chocks in the market. However, 
resource prices are subject to fluctuations in the world market. For example, 
upward shifts in resource prices can bring a windfall to these countries. 
Inversely, when the price falls dramatically, the countries are subject to 
economic shock, and so to economic and political instability. This factor 
requires medium and long-term budget planning in countries where 
resource revenues are a key element. 
 
When a country experiences a large inflow of foreign funds, as is the case 
when a nation sells significant resources to foreign markets, one economic 
result can be a phenomenon known as “Dutch Disease.” Foreign earnings 
from the sale of natural resources are converted into local currency, which 
then causes the local currency to appreciate in value relative to foreign 
currencies. This, in turn, raises the price of domestic goods relative to 
foreign goods. It makes the country’s exports less competitive on the global 
market. So “chewing-gum”1 (imported goods) occupies internal market rather 
than local industries get more and more developed. Local agricultural 
products, manufactured goods, and other items suffer a decline leading to a 
loss of jobs and income, and a greater reliance on the oil, gas, or mining 
sector for government revenues. In this case government has to choice a 
solid fiscal mechanism.  
 
                                                 
1
 Here « chewing gum » symbolizes in fact a set of harmful effects, observed in oil-rich countries. In the fist 
time, local currency appreciates due to oil-based-inflows. In the second time, not only from weakness of 
competitive sectors but also from abondance of foreign currency reserves, foreign trade balance is andomaged. 
But because of oil-export one can not feel this situation. However, when an oil price decrease in the oil market 
then the well-known problems emerge.      
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In many countries, revenues from extractive industries are treated as if they 
will last forever. Often, they are spent on ongoing budget programs instead of 
strategic investments that could help prepare for when resource revenues 
will decline and disappear. In Kazakhstan, the national government created 
a special National Fund in 2000 that receives a designated portion of 
national oil revenues. The fund is designed to meet two main objectives: to 
use oil revenues to ensure stable social and economic development by 
reducing the economy’s vulnerability to oil price fluctuations, and to 
accumulate financial resources for future generations.  
 
The time when Kazakhstan beneficed from oil windfall coincided with its 
economic, social and political transition period. It is absolutely important 
that Kazakhstan do not miss this occasion for going out from transition and 
for developing its institutions in accordance with the conditions of market 
economy. This paper aims to analyze the Kazakh Oil Fund’s impacts on 
fiscal, budgetary and macroeconomic stability of the country.   
 
 
B. The Functioning of the National Fund of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (NFRK) 
 
 
The NFRK was founded through a presidential decree in 2000. In its 
foundation Norway’s Oil Fund was modeled. Nevertheless Asian crisis that 
led to a decline in oil-prices and the devaluation of the ruble have decreased 
the importance of the oil-fund project. The IMF has played a crucial role in 
the establishment of the fund. Because the IMF considers oil funds as a 
helping institutional mechanism for fiscal policy of countries with low 
transparency and governance ratios. In fact a solid and disciplinary fiscal 
and budget policies are the best solution. But in some cases like in oil-riche 
countries, one must refer to “second best” solutions. Thus oil funds do not 
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have the same effect as solid fiscal and budget policy but they support the 
later.    
 
The NFRK contains stabilization and saving funds. Its mission was defined 
as “stabilization of socioeconomic development of the country” and “saving 
accumulation for the generations to come” and also “reduction of 
vulnerability of the country to the external factors”. In this framework the 
NFRK operate within the Central Bank of Kazakhstan. 
 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
 
The main revenues of the fund comes from corporate income taxes, profit 
taxes, royalties, VAT, bonuses paid by the 11 oil companies and 3 metal 
producers in Kazakhstan. And also incomes from privatization of national 
oil-sector-establishments are added into the funds of the NFRK.  
 
Regulation of the NFRK is sufficiently complicated. All revenues collected in 
the NFRK are shared among the budget, the stabilization fund and the 
saving fund with regard to a benchmark in accordance with the regulation. 
The benchmark-price is determined in consideration of the oil, natural gas 
and mining prices in the world market. In 2001 the benchmark was fixed in 
19$/barel for a 5-year period. Every dollar obtained over the benchmark is 
collected as stabilization funds in the NFRK. However 90% of every dollar 
gained up to 19$/barel is subject to the government’s spending.  The saving 
fund receives 10% of the income under the benchmark. Stabilization and 
saving funds are kept by the NFRK. When oil price fall under the 
benchmark, budget deficit can be compensated by the NFRK in 20 days. In 
2001 the IMF determined a benchmark. And for example in 2002 245 mil.$ 
were accumulated in the NFRK. If the oil price was 15$/barel, the NFRK 
would inject 69 mil. $ to the budget.  
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[Figure 2] 
 
 
The complicity of the rules attracted the attention in the Country Report of 
the IMF (IMF, 2003; p. 15-22). The IMF warned that income collection 
regulation was complicated. And it advised the government to use the model 
of Norwegian Oil Fund. In order to support technically, the IMF and the 
World Bank have developed a model which took into consideration the cost 
structure of every oil company. The IMF staffs estimated in the same report 
that “future fiscal inflows from the petroleum sector, on the basis of existing 
reserves, but excluding  privatization earnings, bonuses, and exploration 
license fees, suggest an undiscounted total of some $165 billion over the 
next 45 years; or $11.000 per capita, based on the present population”. And 
they added: “While part of this windfall would be spent on social and 
infrastructure needs (increasing the non-oil budget deficit from current low 
levels), a significant part of the oil wealth is likely to be accumulated in the 
form of financial assets, witch will require continued careful management” 
(IMF, 2003; p. 15).  
 
[Figure 3] 
[Figure 4] 
[Figure 5] 
 
              
The NFRK receives technical assistance from the National Oil Fund of 
Norway. 
 
Diversification and minimization of risks are the determinant factors for 
investment strategy. The oil fund works with six portfolio managers who 
invest some a sum of fund in framework of the “Agency for Strategic 
Planning”. The NFRK has two portfolios: stabilization and saving portfolios. 
With the former the NFRK invests on Merrill Lynch 6-month US Treasury Bill 
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Index. And with the later, the NFRK invests on Salomon World Government 
Bonds Index and MSCI World excluding energy sector. According to the 
agreement between the Oil Fund and portfolio companies, the portfolio 
managers have to educate personal of the National Bank of Kazakhstan. 
 
In the official regulation of the NFRK, it is predict that 75 % of assets are 
assessed in the portfolio of the saving fund and 25% in the portfolio of the 
saving fund. Both of them are entirely assessed abroad to sterilize pressure 
of foreign inflows and to preserve local currency from excessive appreciation. 
60% des investments are effectuated in the USA and the rest is shared out 
between Europe and Japan.  
 
If one compares the NFRK with the oil fund of Norway, the former seem very 
weak because of weakness of the institutional transparency    and 
governance quality. In Kazakhstan, neither the parliament nor the citizens 
do not have the right of participation to the governance and control of the 
Fond (Tsalik, 2003). Only the president has the right to approve changes in 
the regulation. The parliament do only suggest to the government about 
management of the Fund. When annual report is presented in the 
parliament, the deputies have no power to approve or refuse it. Again only 
the president can determine expenditure schedule from the oil fund. 
However there is no limitation on ad libitum expenditure of the government 
and discretion of the president.  
 
 
[Figure 6] 
 
 
Two economist of the WB (Petersen and Budina, 2002) have noted this risk: 
“when executive chef manages an oil fund over all hierarchy, decisions 
become political”. En 2002, the IMF has talked about, with a report about 
fiscal transparence in Kazakhstan (Fiscal Transparency in Kazakhstan, IFM 
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Country Report, 2003), the need of a budget processes witch will integrate 
the NFRK into the public budget. It suggests that the public budget must 
have a consolidated account which incorporates inflows or outflows to/from 
the Oil Fund. And finally Kazakh government has accomplished this 
suggestion in 2004. Besides, the fact that income and expenditure of the 
NFRK do not appear in the budget and that a large share of taxes is 
allocated to the Fund can lead to a fiscal administration with two directions. 
This situation damages fiscal discipline.  
 
As to transparence, the National bank of Kazakhstan publishes daily, 
monthly, quarterly, annually reports about assets, revenues, and spending 
of the NFRK. Moreover, the Ministry of Finances regularly makes prepare 
analysis and researches to confirm accumulations of taxes from oil 
production. All of them are put on internet in Kazakh and in Russian 
(www.nationalfund.kz). Nevertheless, a large part of periodic documents of 
the National Bank are not presented in English.  
  
On the other hand, the NFRK is subject to some periodic controls of the 
independent audit agencies. Since its activation, audit reports are done by 
Ernst & Young and Fitch Rating. They are published in the local journals 
but not on the web nor in another language that Kazakh. Besides, certain 
foundations (Open Society, Caspian Revenue Watch, and Public Finance 
Monitoring Center) follow fiscal activities of the government and so income 
and spending of the NFRK. However absence of participation of the 
parliament and of the Kazakh people to the decision process represent a 
factor menacing the transparency and so efficiency of the NFRK.   
 
 
C. The Impacts of the NFRK on Monetary, Fiscal and Economic 
Stability 
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When economic stability matters it is possible to take into account 
numerous factors, variables, indicators. But in this case, I have to specify a 
more distinctive framework in order to analyze the eventual impacts of oil 
funds in Kazakhstan because; this institution does not concern all of 
economic factors. Moreover since institutional structure can vary from one 
fund to another and from one country to another, their effects can change 
with priorities defined in economic policy of countries. 
 
First of all, there are two things to specify: first, oil fund is not a “panacea”. 
In a country where quality of governance and transparence do not exist, oil 
fund realizes less than that expected. Second, oil fund can not replace fiscal 
policy (or economic policy) but is a complementary institution that supports 
it. In this context oil fund can contribute to economic development to the 
extent that fiscal policy and expenditure strategy are well defined and well 
carried out. 
 
There can be various reasons for establishing such an institution that make, 
ceteris paribus, economy resistant to well-known harmful impacts in oil-rich 
countries: real exchange appreciation, Dutch disease, public deficit due to 
oil-price volatility, price shocks etc. However when we take a closer look to 
oil funds in oil-rich countries, we can reveal four essential reasons in the 
origin of establishment of oil funds: 
 
1. Appreciation of real exchange rate 
2. Fiscal and budget discipline  
3. Saving for future generations 
4. And economic stability 
 
An oil fund aims at solving these four objectives in general. Among them the 
third is the goal of which the fruits can be collected in the longest time. 
Since six years a portion of oil revenue is kept for generations to come in 
Kazakhstan. In order to analyze saving function of the NFRK we need a 
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longer period. Nevertheless, when oil revenue is kept or assessed in the way 
to sterilize economic system from harmful effect of this revenue, then this 
can have indirect affects on real exchange rate, general economic stability, 
and fiscal stability. Kazakh Oil Fund aim to bridle Excessive appreciation of 
real exchange rate and to contribute to fiscal and economic stability through 
budget and saving.  
 
 
I. The Impacts of NFRK on Real Exchange Rate (RER) 
 
 
The RER followed the form U in the transition countries in the course of 
time. Before the transition, the RER was overestimated because the rate of 
nominal exchange was artificially fixed at relatively high level and the prices 
were being controlled by the state. To the extent that the Transition 
Countries (TC) moved towards the market economy and the prices were 
liberalized, one observed a fall in TC’s RER, caused by the depreciation of the 
local currencies. The difference between supply and demand of the foreign 
assets, which were prone to the official restriction during the Soviet time, 
caused the value-loss of local currency with the transition (Rosenberg and 
Saavalainen; 1998). 
 
After the initial period of stabilization, RER started to be appreciated and to 
approach its level of balance. There are certain factors which lead to this 
appreciation: the increase, related to foreign capital inflows, pressure on 
demand and private consumption. 
 
During the initial phase of the transition, the balance of RER remained 
stable in the absence of the richness and of the productivity. And then it 
started to appreciate to the extent that the process of the transition 
advanced. And in the countries rich in oil, the discovery of the natural 
resources brought RER to a higher level of appreciation (Rosenberg, 
Saavalainen; 1998).  
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The question here is to distinguish the eventual sources of the appreciation. 
Because there are two principal reasons: the transition (the initial 
appreciation) and oil (flows of capital). In this matter, one benefits from the 
simple model from Rosenberg and Saavalainen (1998). So that it is more 
appropriate to this analysis, it is updated.    
 
 
[Figure 7] 
 
 
The figure 7 shows the simple arithmetic mean of the RER (measured 
through the average wages in American dollar). One puts in the analysis 9 
countries of the EEC which does not have oil. In 1995 all of the countries in 
the sample had passed more or less the phase initial of transition. And 
production sharing agreements (PSA) started to be signed in Azerbaijan and 
in Kazakhstan. As one sees in graphics, when the RER were appreciated in 
these countries, this appreciation appears much stronger in Azerbaijan and 
in Kazakhstan2. On the other hand one is not yet assured that this 
difference between the average of the appreciations of the 9 EEC and that of 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan really comes from the oil extraction. To 
understand better the eventual causes of the RER appreciation and the 
impacts of an institution that sterilizes excessive oil income from the 
national economy I build and estimate a time-series regression model. 
 
 
[Figure 8] 
             
 
Since the incomes coming from abroad remove appreciation rate of the local 
currency any thing equal by elsewhere, then one must separate the sources 
                                                 
2
 The two TC which have very large oil reserv. 
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of the reserves in currency into two: those resulting from the oil sector and 
those non-oil sector. 
 
The sterilization of the oil-incomes by the intermediary of an oil fund could 
help to control the excessive appreciation in two ways: by holding foreign 
inflows outside the economy and by reducing the quantity of the foreign 
currencies which circulates inside. This last depends rather on the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank. But in the case of Kazakhstan, a diminution (up 
to certain point determined by the monetary authority) in currency reserves 
which are in the economy allows for RER depreciation. 
 
Currency outflows influence also RER appreciation negatively. Especially 
benefice transfers of the foreign oil companies represent the biggest share of 
the currency outflows. Thus I used this variable because of its effect on RER. 
 
To accentuate the impact of the Russian crisis in 1998, which in particular 
influenced the Ex-USSR countries, I added a dummy variable. And for the 
price chock provoked by Iraq war I used another dummy. 
 
The regression concerns the period between the beginning of the oil boom 
(1996) and the year of 2006 and is estimated with monthly data of the 
Central Bank of Kazakhstan. I took 2001 as the starting date of the 
sterilization of oil income through a special institution.  
 
According to result outgoing from the Estimation I, inflows due to oil 
between 1996 and 2006 influenced the rate of appreciation between 
minimum by 34% (Column IV) and maximum by 46% (Column II) in 
Kazakhstan respectively3. For the same period, appreciation resulting from 
oil-inflows kept its impact on the RER between t and t3. Currency outflow 
has a negative impact as expected. Nevertheless, this loses its effect on RER 
                                                 
3
 I took exponential of the logarithmic values.  
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appreciation in the course of the time whereas this shows its effect at the 
beginning.    
 
I talked about the two impacts of oil-fund institutions: Direct and indirect 
impacts. Firstly, oil fund serves to keep excessive oil income out of the 
economy. This is the direct effect. And while doing so, it shrinks non-oil 
currency reserves. In the middle term, this causes depreciation of the local 
money. And in the long term this encourages the economy (private and 
public sectors) to find alternative economic means to increase currency 
reserves. The first means which come to mind are the development of 
competitive and exporting sectors. 
 
RERA : Real Exchange Rate Appreciation 
OCI : Oil-Currency Inflow 
NOCI : Non-Oil Currency Inflow 
COF  : Currency Outflow 
SOI : Sterilized Oil Income through the Oil Fund 
TRS : Transition Index of the EBRD  
RC : Dummy Variable (Russian Crisis in 1998) 
IRAQ : Oil-Price Chock after Iraq War 
 
εββ
βββα
+++++
+++=
IRAQRCTRSSOI
COFNOCIOCIPERA
tt
ttttt
lnln
lnlnln
54
321                                      (1) 
 
 
[Estimation 1] 
 
 
In the case of Kazakhstan, sterilization of oil-income by the NFRK caused 
depreciation by 15%. And this impact slowly increases in the middle term. 
As to the indirect effect, that is to say “shrinking of non-oil reserves”, it 
remains sufficiently modest at -1-2%. So the impact of the NFRK on the 
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appreciation of RER is about 16-18%. One can conclude that the Kazakh Oil 
Fund has started to manifest its effect on RER appreciation. 
 
What we can say about transition effect is that the biggest share of the RER 
appreciation results from oil-inflows but not from transition effect. It is true 
that Kazakhstan has not yet achieved its transition. But in term of 
appreciation of the local currency, we can not talk about today a great effect. 
Contrary, Kazakh economy is more sensible to price chocks in the oil market 
than to transition. The estimation justifies it. Kazakh economy gets more 
and more oil-country-likeness.                 
 
On the other hand the constants significantly remain large whereas this is 
non-significant. There are still several factors which allow the RER 
appreciation to be. It is probable that the largest part of the unexplained 
circumstances results from factors related to the transition. However the 
absence of certain data bases does not enable us to widen the regression 
while adding other variables. The lack of data ad hoc prevents from reducing 
this greatness.  
 
 
II. The Impacts of the NFRK on the Fiscal Stability 
 
 
The special characteristic of the oil income make necessary that the 
attention is given to certain indicators contributing to the suitable 
interpretation of the impacts of this excessive inflows on the economy.  This 
is the condition sine qua non of efficient budgetary and fiscal policies for an 
oil-producing country. The adaptation of such policies to the special 
characteristic of oil income puts at the foreground the importance of non-oil 
fiscal balance, as an indicator, in the oil-producing countries. For example, 
in Norway, the non-oil balance is considered as determining instrument at 
the time of all the debates on the budget and fiscal policy (Barnett and 
Ossowski, 2003). 
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If the government decides to spend oil income, seemingly the expenditure 
can increase without deterioration in the general balance of the budget 
(Barnett, Ossowski, 2003). However the higher the governmental expenditure 
is the larger the demand pressure on the economy and on the imports is. This 
effect derives from the non oil fiscal deficit. On the other hand, as an indicator, 
the general balance of the budget does not precisely reflect this effect.  
 
The general balance feeds at the same time on oil and non-oil incomes. 
When the oil prices fall, the non-oil deficit is shown more precisely. Since 
there is always such a risk related to price volatility, then always a pressure 
due to the excessive expenditure of the government exists. Moreover this 
pressure has the capacity to influence several indicators from public debts to 
inflation rate through demand. Moreover, deterioration in the general 
balance of the budget, because of the low oil income, can hide the significant 
efforts of the fiscal adjustment (Davis et all, 2003).  
 
In addition, if the expenditure increased during the rise of the oil price, it 
could be difficult and expensive to finance the non-oil deficit in the absence 
of a mechanism of fiscal compensation (Davis et all, 2001). For example, the 
internal financing of a public deficit can cause inflation or contraction of 
investments so shrinking of the private sector. And as a result the financing 
would be more expensive. 
 
For all these mentioned reasons, non-oil fiscal balance is more appropriate 
to the analysis than the general balance. I will build a new time-series 
regression model in the light of what I stated above.  
 
Contrary to certain oil funds, the NFRK operates also stabilization function. 
Compared to a reference price, the government determines the limit of 
transfers to the budget from the oil fund. 90% of each dollar gained under 19 
$/barrel go directly to the budget. The oil income allocated to the budget is 
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that which is obtained between the production cost and the price of 
reference. The increase in the oil income in the budget depends on the 
output of the oil companies because the price of reference is fixed.  
 
 
[Figure 9] 
[Figure 10] 
 
In the Figure 9 we see only the oil income destined to the budget but not 
that destined to the NFRK. From 2001 the total incomes of the budget 
exceeded the expenditure for the first time. Thus a budget surplus matters. 
This comes not only from the oil income but also from the increase in the 
non-oil incomes. It is clear that the government tried to develop its non-oil 
sources (in particular that which comes from the non-oil sector) because its 
income is fixed by the means of a benchmark.     
 
As for the non-oil balance we observe deterioration in the budgetary balance. 
Even if after the establishment of the NFRK slightly limited, this imbalance 
deepens. However the dispersion of the oil incomes between the 
governmental budget and the NFRK decreased the non-oil deficit at more 
reasonable level (of 13% in 2000 to 8% on average). 
 
In addition, the assets of the NFRK were not used apart from its objectives 
with the discretion of the Kazakh government. For example Kazakhstan 
decided to take part in the project of Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) why It does 
not want to be dependent on the pipelines of Russia. But its governmental 
financing is made through the budgets of the oil companies of the State 
(Gazmunaigaz, Karachaganak). 
 
NFRKS : NFRK’s share in the budget (in % of GDP) 
SFS  : Stabilization Fund’s share (in % of GDP) 
SNOR : Share of non-oil revenue (in % of GDP) 
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εββα +++= ttt SFSNFRKSSNOR lnlnln 21                                  (2) 
 
 
 
[Estimation 2] 
 
 
 
Before looking at non-oil deficit, now, let us build a model to analyze 
whether or not foundation of an oil fund served to non-oil public revenue of 
Kazakhstan. By separating the functions from the stabilization of the NFRK, 
one calculates the effect of the NFRK on the change of the non-oil incomes. 
The Fund has a direct and indirect effect. When the oil incomes accumulate 
into the Fund, this forces the government to resort to the other sources. It is 
the indirect effect. On the other side, the fact that the oil share to the budget 
each year is fixed through the price of reference encourages the government 
to diversify its non-oil sources and to slow down the expenditure for the 
budget financing. It is the direct effect of the Fund.  
 
The indirect effect of the NFRK on the change of the non-oil incomes is about 
1.2%, and its direct effect by the stabilization funds is found between 8% 
and 9% since its foundation. Finally, according to the regression which I 
made with the quarterly data, the total impact is approximately 10%. 
 
Rebuild the regression model to clarify the impact of the NFRK on the non-
oil-balance of Kazakhstan:  
 
NOD : Non-oil Deficit (in% of GDP) 
 
εβββα ++++= tttt SNORSFSNFRKSNOD lnlnlnln 321    (3) 
 
[Estimation 3] 
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Taking the exponential of the coefficients, since its foundation the NFRK has 
served to reduced non-oil deficit by 8%. And transfers from the stabilization 
fund to the budget have contributed to this reduction by 2%. Finally, 
constitution of an oil fund pushed the government to try to find alternatives 
solution to increase non-oil revenue.  The rising in the non-oil revenue 
decreased the non-oil deficit by about 10%. Nevertheless, the eventual 
impacts of the existence of an oil-fund remained weak. The coefficient of the 
constant term is very high and positive. There is still “something” that harms 
budget discipline. But econometrically we are not in a position to say what 
this “something” is.   
  
            
III. The impacts of the NFRK on the Macro-economic Stability   
 
 
In which way does the NFRK influence Kazakh economy since its 
foundations? To answer this question, one needs to build a 
multidimensional model because macroeconomic stability relates to several 
factors, instruments, and indicators of the economy.    
 
The figure 11 shows how the dangerous effects coming from the unbalanced 
oil incomes emergent and extend. Capital flows influence the economic 
structure in several manners. On a side, foreign inflows remove the demand 
of the local currency and thus its appreciation which results in the rise of 
relative prices. On the other side, the fluctuations in the oil incomes make 
the budget vulnerable to the oil price. The government that increased its 
expenditure at the time of the rise of the oil price can face the budget deficit 
during the fall of the oil price. At the same time uncontrolled expenditure 
and budget deficits cause the inflationary pressure. 
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[Figure 11] 
 
However inflation is found in the middle of all the factors. Each of them has 
direct or indirect effects on inflation rate. In this case, the eventual impacts 
of oil income on other economic indicators, are seen best by the intermediary 
inflation rate.  
 
All the elements of the table constitute a vicious circle. If the oil fund 
functions well, it could contribute to reduction of the excessive appreciation 
and of the budget deficit related to the volatility of the oil price. It is thus 
possible to test whether or not the direct or indirect effects of the oil fund 
reflect through inflation rate.  Let us build the model with the concerned 
variables.  
 
INF  : Consumer Prices Index 
NFRK  : the NFRK’s assets (in % of GDP) 
NOD  : Non-oil Deficit (in % of GDP) 
PEX  : Public Expenditure (in % of GDP) 
NOFTD : Non-oil Foreign Trade Deficit (in % of GDP) 
NOGDP : Non-oil GDP  
INT  : Interest Rate 
RERA  : RER Appreciation 
M2  : Monetary Supply (M2/GDP)  
CUR  : Currency Reserves (in % of GDP) 
   
tttttt
ttttt
eCURMRERAINTNOGFDP
NOFTDPEXNODNFRKINF
++++++
++++=
98765
4321
2
ln
βββββ
ββββα
   (4) 
 
 
[Estimation 4] 
 
 
According to the result of the Estimation 4, the NFRK has a weak direct 
effect on the economic stability (-9%). However as to the indirect effects, for 
example, the effect of the public expenditure, caused by several factors like 
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the oil incomes, takes negative value in Kazakhstan. The reduction in 
governmental expenditure allowed a fall in the inflation rate. 
 
The largest pressures on the macroeconomic balance result from the 
appreciation and the non-oil deficit. The first one which is partially under 
the effect of the Oil Fund takes negative values for reasons about which I 
talked previously. 
 
However the NFRK’s success comes from the application of reference price. 
Even if they are the defects about the transparency and of the quality of 
regulation, the existence of a stabilization fund within the NFRK which 
accumulates a portion of oil income compared to a benchmark constitutes 
a relatively strong supports for stability macroeconomic. 
 
 
D. Conclusion 
 
 
Kazakhstan has established the NFRK in order to evaluate incomes coming 
from oil extraction and exports and to preserve its economy from well-known 
harmful effects. However, an oil fund is not a “magic wand” but is just an 
institution which supports decision mechanism of disciplined governments. 
It would be not true for now to expect that a transition country, like 
Kazakhstan, has a strong institutional structure and transparent 
governance which are the condition sine qua non of the efficient functioning 
of an oil fund.   
 
Moreover, the time which has passed since its constitution is not too 
sufficient to have a solid judgment about the NFRK’s efficiency but even so 
one can say that, sterilizing oil income, the Fund has started to show its firs 
positive impacts on Kazakh economy. In consideration of direct and indirect 
effects of the NFRK on the three components of the economic stability, its 
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biggest effect occurred in deducing of the excessive part of the RER 
appreciation. The Fund manifested its positive effect in exiting the 
Government to orientation of increase public revenue from non-oil economy. 
Nevertheless non-oil budget deficit is still very high. Just keeping oil-income 
is not sufficient to establish budget discipline. The NFRK’s on stability 
impacts are still weak but positive.       
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Figure 1: Benchmark Structure of the NFRK 
 
 
Figure 2: Assets of the NFRK 
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Source: Central Bank of Kazakhstan (2006) 
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Figure 3: Public Share of Oil Income of Kazakhstan 

Source: IMF (2003) 
 
             
Figure 4:Stabilisation Fund 
             
 PORTFOLIO OF THE STABILISATION FUND 
Foreign Curency 
Reserves: 14,86
Central Bank 
Bonds: 20,7
Bonds of 
Ministry of 
Finances; 8,8Shares; 55,7
 
               Source: Caspian Revenue Watch (2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


	

 	
	 

 	
	  
  !
 
"##$ %&$& '&(" "($
"##( )#$( '*$& ""$
"##% )*+' '&)' "'+
"##) **#' '&*( '&#
"#'# '#+"" "'(# 
"#'( '(#*' "*+# 
"#"# '))*# $%## 
"#+# '&#(# ))(# 
"#$# (#%# "$## 
 
FISCAL REVENU OF KAZAKHSTAN FROM OIL PRODUCTION  
 25 
 
Figure 5:Saving Fund 
PORTFOLIO OF THE SAVING FUND 
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  Source: Caspian Revenue Watch (2003) 
 
 
Figure 6: Governance of the NFRK 
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           Figure 7: RER expressed in Salary Term 
Evolution of Average Salary 
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Source : Rosenberg et Saavalainen (1998), Country Reports (IMF, 
2006). 
 
  Figure 8: RER Appreciation of Kazakhstan 
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     Source: Central Bank of Kazakhstan (2006) 
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      Estimation 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 9: Budget Components of Kazakhstan 
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Source: Open Society, Kazakhstan (2004) and the NFRK (2006). 
 
Explained Variable: PERA 
Method: OLS  
Date:1/1996-12/2006 
 I II III IV 
 t t-1 t-2 t-3 
Constant 2.123055 1.890012 1.791697 1.234691 
lnOCI 0.331411 0.384123 0.311113 0.297894 
lnNOCI -0.023144 -0.013598 -0.011897 -0.008123 
lnCOF -0.100139 -0.083161 -0.042634 -0.012649 
lnSOI -0.141613 -0.161793 -0.170012 -0.142369 
RC 0.056941 0.044001 0.001236 0.000635 
IRAQ 0.041389 0.065136 0.053333 0.018947 
TRANS 0.010102 0.010023 0.010169 0.009792 
 
    
R2 0.908710 0.879632 0.854691 0.801694 
All values significant at 10%.  
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     Figure 10: Budget Balance 
           
Budget Balance of Kazakhstan
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 Source: The Ministry of Finances of Kazakhstan (2006). 
 
 
 
                    Estimation 2 
Explicated variable: SNOR 
Method: OLS 
Date: 1st quarter 2000 – 2nd quarter 2006 
 I II III IV 
 t t-1 t-2 t-3 
Constant -1.287911 -2.136479 -1.986418 -1.566879 
NFRKS 0.081121 0.091613 0.064879 0.059791 
SFS 0.012310 0.022290 0.015581 0.010101 
     
R2 0.878870 0.787949 0.705659 0.655547 
All values  significant at 10 % 
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       Estimation 3 
Explicated variable: NOD 
Method: OLS 
Date: 1st quarter 2000 – 2nd quarter 2006 
 I II III IV 
 t t-1 t-2 t-3 
Constant 1.245698 1.299987 0.568103 0.894567 
NFRKS -0.084514 -0.120031 -0.101210 -0.091278 
SFS -0.022231 -0.019005 -0.014124 -0.011890 
SNOR -0.111351 -0.091023 -0.081356 -0.076891 
     
R2 0.702589 0.710055 0.650101 0.610213 
Significant at 10 % 
 
           Estimation 4 
Explicated variable: INF 
Method: OLS 
Date: 1/2000 – 12/2006 
 I II III IV 
 t t-1 t-2 t-3 
Constant 1,1083455 * 2.136478 3.326548 5.998412 
NFRK -0.08916211 * -0.091102** -0.106548* -0.09456 
NOD 0.1112912 * 0.091222** 0.045502* 0.004681 
PEX -0.022007 * -0.031378* -0.001558* -0.015697 
NOFTD 0.0387761 ** 0.035444* 0.045567** 0.0405987*** 
NOGDP 0.0107871 ** 0.009887* 0.007558*** 0.000602*** 
INT 0.036566 ** 0.036001* 0.030001* 0.022987 
RERA 0.2178934 * 0.181647** 0.100654** 0.098761 
M2 0.073334 * 0.068912** 0.044468** 0.055554 
CUR -0.0071678 *** -0.003158*** -0.002012*** -0.012560 
     
R2 0.94661    
* Significant at 5 % ;  ** 10 % ; ***  at 20 % 
The values in Column IV are not confidentially significant. 
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Figure 11 : Impacts of oil-revenue 
 
 
BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE 
The excessive expenditure of 
the government at the time of 
the fall of the oil price can 
creates an inflationary 
pressure by inflating demand.  
In addition, the compensation 
of the deficit through interior 
dept allows the inflationary 
pressure. 
 
APPRECIATION: When one 
does not sterilize excessive 
currencies from economy that 
causes the appreciation of the 
local currency which allows 
the rise in relative price. 
 
INTEREST RATE: If one 
saves the oil incomes in the 
form of financial credits, this 
can reduce the long-term 
interest rate.  
 
  INFLATION 
In the case of recourse to the 
interior debt, interest rate can 
increase.  
 
TAXATION DISCIPLINE 
When government concentrates 
on the taxes coming from the 
non-oil economy, this can reduce 
the excessive demand which 
causes the inflationary pressure.  
 
In the case of volatility of oil 
prices, the government which 
gives the importance to oil 
incomes can face to cover the 
budget deficit with debt 
instead of the taxes coming 
from the non-oil economy. 
 
The financing of the non-oil 
deficit of the foreign trade can 
increase the burden of the 
foreign debts and their interest 
rates. 
 
Imports increase, competitive sectors 
weaken, and non-oil foreign trade deficit 
emerges. Economic crisis occurs in case 
where the oil incomes stop.  
 
The weakening of the 
competitive sectors causes the 
tax avoidance and allows the 
reduction in the tax incomes. 
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